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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
-vs-
CRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL, 
Defendant & Appellant. Case No. 14248 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Pursuant to stipulation and leave of this Court, and in the light of the case 
of Gregg v. Georgia, decided July 2, 1976 by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, hereinafter referred to as the Gregg case; and the case of Profit vs . 
Florida, decided July 2, 1976 by the Supreme Court of the United States, herein-
after referred to as the Profit case (the citations of which are not available to the 
wri ter) ; the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell, (hereinafter referred to merely 
as "Marvell"), files this amended and supplemental brief. 
The original brief herein sets forth the kind of case; the disposition in the 
lower court; the relief sought on appeal; a statement of the facts; and conclusion. 
Reference to the original brief is made in coverage of these mat te rs . 
The Appellant Marvell re i terates the argument set forth in Point I and II, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and many of the observations made in Point III and Point IV are pertinent as 
Points III and IV are herein supplemented and amended. The conclusion remains 
as in the original brief on file herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IE 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BY THE COURT WAS IN VIOLATIOI 
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IT BEING CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
In the initial brief submitted herein, on behalf of the Appellant Marvell, the 
position was taken in Point III that the imposition of the death penalty by the Court 
was in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States, it being cruel and unusual punishment. Since the filing of the brief, 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Gregg and Profit cases has held that 
the death penalty does not per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
On occasion, it has been said that the Supreme Court of the United States 
follows the election re turns ; and it may now be asserted that the Court follows the 
public opinion polls and the legislative enactments of individual States. In the Gregg 
case, the Court stated: 
!fDespite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, 
over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now 
evident that a large proportion of American society continue to 
regard it as appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. 
nThe most marked indication of societyTs endorsement of the 
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death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Fur-
man. The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted 
new statutes that provide for the death penalty.11 
However, in its circumambient decision in the Gregg case, as it reviews 
its decision in the Furman case, the Court also quotes Chief Justice Warren that 
the Eighth Amendment nmust draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 9, provides that cruel and 
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted. Irrespective of the views expressed by 
the majority in the Gregg case, it is within the province of this Court to asser t the 
maturity and established high moral principles of the State of Utah, and hold with-
out equivocation and circumambiency that the death penalty is cruel and unusual 
punishment and does not accord with the dignity of man and humane justice. 
POINT IV r 
SECTION 76-3-207 U.C. A. 1953 SHOULD BE HELD AS NOT CONFORMING TO 
LAW, AND THE CAUSE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SENTENCE 
OF THE APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
The Utah statute, Section 76-3-207 is a hybrid of the Georgia and Florida 
statutes enacted following the Furman decision, but is deficient in its relationship 
to the statutes of both of these states as appears from the Gregg and Profit cases . 
The Georgia statute, which sets up a bifurcated procedure, as does the 
Utah statute, provides guidelines for the jury in its determination of whether or 
not it will impose the death penalty for first degree murder . However, the Georgia 
statute requires that in the event the jury return a verdict that the sentence shall be 
rsi 
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death, it must make a specific finding justifying its conclusion. If the jury does 
impose the death penalty, the Georgia statute further provides for an automatic 
review of the sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to safeguard against preju-
dicial or arbitary factors; to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate 
compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases; and whether the impo-
sition of the death penalty is unwarranted. 
The Florida statute is s imilar to the Georgia Statute, except that in Florida 
the sentence is determined by the tr ial judge, the jury acting in only an advisory 
capacity, and it being necessary for the tr ial judge to make written findings sup-
porting the sentence of death. The Florida statute, like the Georgia statute pro-
vides for automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida in all cases in which 
a death sentence is imposed. , ; i 
The Utah Statute, Section 76-3-207, in its bifurcated system, provides that 
the presentence hearing be conducted before either the court or jury on the issue of 
penalty. There is no requirement that if the jury ar r ives at a unanimous verdict 
for death, it must detail its reason for such sentence; and there is no requirement 
that the court make written findings in the event the hearing is conducted before the 
court, and the court imposes the sentence of death. Unlike both the Georgia and 
Florida statutes, the Utah statute fails to provide for an automatic review by the 
Supreme Court of Utah in the event the sentence of death is imposed. In both the 
Gregg and Profit cases , the Supreme Court of the United States s t ressed the im-
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portance of the mandatory and automatic appelate review system in independently 
determing whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is warranted. 
As set forth in the initial brief submitted herein on behalf of Marvell under 
Point IV, the Furman case decries the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries 
in determining whether defendants committing certain crimes should die or be im-
prisoned. That situation continues to prevail under Section 76-3-207, U.C.A. 1953, 
wherein it is provided that in the further proceedings on the issue of penalty evi-
dence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence.. 
As to mitigating circumstances, the statute sets forth some standards; as to ag-
gravating circumstances, no standards are set forth, but reference merely made 
to Sec. 75-5-292 U. C. A. 1953 wherein is set forth and defined what constitutes 
murder in the first degree. Marvell, along with two other defendants, was charged 
in this matter with the crime of murder in the first degree by intentionally or know-
ingly causing the death of Michael Hogan, while he was engaged in the commission, 
or attempted commission, or flight after committing or attempting to commit burg-
lary or kidnapping. This charge, standing alone, under the provisions of Sec. 
76-3-207 U. C. A. 1953 constitutes the agravating circumstances of this cause - -
if any other circumstances or standards were considered by the Court in passing 
sentence, it has to be under the uncontrolled and untrammelled discretion of the 
Court, for no other standard has been legislated to guide Court or jury in a r r iv -
ing at a conclusion. 
[5] 
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Under the Georgia statute the presentence hearing is conducted before 
whomever made the determination of guilt. As pointed out in the original brief, 
in the instant case it was impracticable to conduct the pre-sentence hearing be-
fore the jury because of the fact that the Court erroneously insisted upon the selec 
tion of a "death-qualified" jury - - a panel of jurors comprised of only those who 
would definitely support the penalty of death in the event of conviction. State vs . 
Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P2d 519. This situation left the appellants with no 
choice but to waive the hearing before the jury and have same held before the Cour 
the predilection of which was unknown and could not be determined. 
The t r ia l Court in rendering its decision found the murder to be brutal and 
ruthless and without any cause. However, having made such finding, the Court 
made the very astute observation that the accused Dunsdon was the only one of the 
defendants who had any motive whatsoever. (Rep. Tr . pgs. 596 & 646). The Court ap-
parently failed to give consideration to the fact that until the evening of the murder 
the accused Dunsdon had never met or known Marvell. (Rep.Tr.pgs. 481 & 596). Ths 
the only reason Marvell accompanied Dundson to the residence of the deceased was 
to show him where the deceased resided. (Rep. T r . p . 593). The Court found that at 
the time of the murder the capacity of Marvell to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct was not substantially impaired as a result of drugs or intoxication. (Rep, 
T r . p . 648). However, in the light of all the testimony, the question necessarily 
presents itself whether any man, with no record of violence in his background, in 
[6] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the full possession of his faculties, neither intoxicated nor under the influence of 
drugs, would accompany a revengeful stranger whom he had just met, on an e s -
capade of the murderous character involved in this cause. To answer the question 
in the affirmative is to be naive and unrealist ic. 
The Court 's finding that the defendant Dunsdon nhad a very vivid recollection 
of what happened, n (Rep.Tr.p. 647) and the Court no doubt influenced by the repre -
sentations made by counsel for the State at the session in chambers (Rep.Tr .pgs . 
37-51) when neither Marvell nor his attorney were present, the Court was not only 
influenced but accepted the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant Dunsdon, an 
accomplice to the cr ime, who stated that he had struck the victim with brass 
knuckles, but it was Marvell who, without evidence of motive or reason, wielded 
the rifle of the defendant Codianna, and shot and killed the deceased. Since a con-
viction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by 
other evidence, Sec. 77-31-18 U.C.A. 1953, certainly such uncorroborated tes t i -
mony demanded the Court 's most searching questioning as to its truth, coming 
from one endeavoring to exonerate himself; should have carr ied no weight, nor in 
any manner been persuasive, so as to justify the Court in sentencing Marvell to 
death, when without corroboration it would not have sustained his conviction. 
The Utah statute, Section 76-3-207 U. C. A. 1953, by its, failure to pro-
vide for specific findings, by either jury or court, upon which a sentence of death 
is found warranted; and by its failure to provide for an automatic appeal in the 
[7] 
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event of the imposit ion of the death sen tence ; not to mention i ts fa i lure to se t 
forth any s tandards as to aggrava t ing c i r c u m s t a n c e s justifying the death penalty; 
the Utah statute fails to mee t the demands of Gregg and Prof i t , in both of which 
c a s e s grea t s t r e s s is placed upon t he se r e q u i r e m e n t s to mee t the concerns of the 
F u r m a n c a s e . 
Respectfully submi t ted , 
sSftJ^ 
ckson IV^ OTrve C r a i g D e r r i c k s o n ]\^^i^vell 
Appellant 
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